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1. Motivation 
As the global economic crisis unfolds, policymakers around the world are faced with 
increasing pressures to resort to protectionist measures in support of domestic 
employment.  The G20 November 2008 Summit in Washington underscored “the critical 
importance of rejecting protectionism and pledged that “within the next 12 months, we 
will refrain from raising new barriers to investment or to trade in goods and services, 
imposing new export restrictions, or implementing World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
inconsistent measures to stimulate exports”, and the April 2009 Summit in London 
extended this pledge to the end of 2010. Yet, as Gamberoni and Newfarmer (2009) point 
out, between November 2008 and March 2009 17 of the G20 members have already 
implemented policy measures that restrict trade at the expense of other countries. Bown 
(2009) reports a significant rise in the imposition of WTO-compliant trade remedy 
measures such as anti-dumping and countervailing duties in the first quarter of 2009 
compared to the corresponding 2008 figures and a sharp rise in the initiation of trade 
remedy investigations over the same period. While these indications of recent 
protectionist trends are certainly a far cry from the spiralling protectionism of the 1930s, 
and the trade restrictions implemented so far are limited in scope, it is widely expected 
that pressures on policymakers to adopt protectionist measures in favour of domestic 
producers will intensify as the crisis deepens.
1
 WTO director-general Pascal Lamy (2009) 
warns of the dangers “of an incremental build-up of restrictions that could slowly strangle 
international trade”.  
It is important to note that the present WTO regulations governing the multilateral trading 
system leave considerable scope for rule-consistent increases in import barriers. This 
scope arises not only from the aforementioned limited WTO trade remedy provisions, 
which allow conditional resort to anti-dumping measures, countervailing duties to offset 
subsidies to exporters in other countries and safeguard measures, but also from the 
presence of substantial binding overhangs – or “water” - in the tariff schedules of many 
WTO members. Binding overhang exists when the bound tariff rate for a product line – 
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 See e.g. Baldwin and Evenett (2009), Dadush (2009), Erixon (2009), Rollo and Holmes (2009), Hufbauer 
and Stephenson (2009). 
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that is the maximum tariff a country can impose under its WTO obligations – exceeds the 
actual applied tariff imposed by the country.  While binding overhangs are generally 
small for OECD countries, pre-Doha bound tariff rates for middle-and low-income 
countries are frequently a multiple of the corresponding applied rates. This fact is 
noteworthy, since – as pointed out by Hufbauer and Stephenson (2009) – leaders of low-
income countries badly hit by the crisis are under considerable pressure to take 
immediate action, but lack the fiscal space for domestic support measures – and hence 
“trade policy is one of the few levers at their disposal”. 
A swift successful completion of the Doha Round would gradually reduce existing 
binding overhangs considerably and would thus reduce the threat of a WTO-compliant 
rise in global protection that is bound to impede an economic recovery. Indeed, Bouet 
and Laborde Debucquet (2009) suggest that a conclusion of the Doha Development 
Agenda should appropriately be seen as a multilateral insurance scheme against the 
adverse consequences of a beggar-thy-neighbour trade policy scenario, in which 
countries raise tariffs to their bound levels across the board. Correspondingly, a proper 
evaluation of the costs of a failed Doha Round would not only include the foregone 
ordinary net welfare gains arising from the negotiated reductions in trade distortions but 
should include the welfare losses associated with rising protection under a no-Doha 
outcome.
2
 
 
Inspired by the approach proposed in Bouet and Laborde Debucquet (2009), this paper  
employs a global computable general equilibrium (CGE) trade model to contrast the 
outcomes of a successful Doha agreement with the consequences of a scenario in which 
countries raise their import duties to the maximum levels compatible with current WTO 
obligations. The study complements the earlier CGE analysis of Bouet and Laborde 
Debucquet by using a more differentiated regional disaggregation with a particular focus 
on low-income regions in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, by adopting alternative factor 
market closures that allow for unemployment and underutilization of capital in the short 
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 From this perspective, the recent suggestion of Mattoo and Subrimanian (2009) to abandon the Doha 
Development Round altogether in favour of a more ambitious multilateral negotiation agenda would seem 
to be counterproductive. 
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run, and by incorporating the most recent (December 2008) Doha Round draft modality 
revisions in the analysis. 
 
The following section provides a brief informal outline of the analytical framework and 
highlights some salient features of the benchmark data set. Section 3 describes the trade 
policy scenarios under consideration and presents simulation results. Section 4 draws 
conclusions. 
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2. The Analytic Framework  
2.1 The GLOBE Model 
The analytic framework for the analysis is the GLOBE model, a theory-grounded, 
comparative-static, multi-region, multi-sectoral CGE model of global production and 
trade.
3
 The model is calibrated to the new GTAP7 database that reflects the global input-
output structure of production and trade by origin and destination in 2004. The database 
distinguishes 113 geographical regions and 57 commodity groups. For the present study, 
we retain the full geographical detail for the individual least developed country (LDC) 
regions and other DfID focus countries identified in the dataset along with a range of 
other developing country (DC) regions and three OECD
+
 regions.
4
 As shown in Table 1, 
the model distinguishes 32 regions including 19 DfID focus regions and 9 other DC 
regions. To keep the analysis tractable and allow a compact presentation of results, the 
sectoral aggregation used in this study distinguishes five broad commodity groups and 
activities: food and food products, fuels, other primary products, non-food 
manufacturing, and services. The model includes five primary production factors: skilled 
labour, unskilled labour, capital, land and natural resources. 
 
International Trade 
Domestically produced commodities are assumed to be imperfect substitutes for traded 
goods. Import demand is modelled via a series of nested constant elasticity of substitution 
(CES) functions; imported commodities from different source regions to a destination 
region are assumed to be imperfect substitutes for each other and are aggregated to form 
composite import commodities that are assumed to be imperfect substitutes for their 
counterpart domestic commodities The composite imported commodities and their 
counterpart domestic commodities are then combined to produce composite consumption 
commodities, which are the commodities demanded by domestic agents as intermediate 
inputs and final demand (private consumption, government, and investment). Export 
supply is modelled via a series of nested constant elasticity of transformation (CET) 
                                                 
3
 For a detailed technical documentation of the model, see McDonald, Thierfelder and Robinson (2007).  
4
 OECDAsia and OECDEurope in the model include a number of non-OECD high-income countries – 
hence the label OECD
+
. 
5 
 
functions; the composite export commodities are assumed to be imperfect substitutes for 
domestically consumed commodities, while the exported commodities from a source 
region to different destination regions are assumed to be imperfect substitutes for each 
other. The composite exported commodities and their counterpart domestic commodities 
are then combined as composite production commodities. The use of nested CET 
functions for export supply implies that domestic producers adjust their export supply 
decisions in response to changes in the relative prices of exports and domestic 
commodities. This specification is desirable in a global model with a mix of developing 
and developed countries that produce different kinds of traded goods with the same 
aggregate commodity classification, and yields more realistic behaviour of international 
prices than models assuming perfect substitution on the export side. 
 
Production, Input Demand and Factor Markets 
Production relationships by activities are characterized by nested Constant Elasticity of 
Substitution (CES) production functions. Activity output is a CES composite of aggregate 
intermediate inputs and aggregate value added, while aggregate intermediate inputs are a 
Leontief aggregate of the individual intermediate commodity inputs and aggregate value 
added is a CES composite of primary factors demanded by each activity. The 
determination of product supply and input demand is based on the assumption of profit 
maximizing behaviour.  
In the simulation two alternative factor market closures without and with factor market 
rigidities are considered. Under the first closure, all markets are characterized by inelastic 
factor supplies and the model solves for market-clearing factor prices. Under the 
alternative closure, the real wages of skilled and unskilled labour as well as the rental 
rates of capital are fixed in terms of the domestic consumer price index and the supply of 
these factors is infinitely elastic. In this specification, any shock that would otherwise 
reduce the equilibrium wage will instead lead to increased unemployment.  
While capital, skilled and unskilled labour is mobile across activities, land and natural 
resources are activity-specific under the activity aggregation used in the present study.  
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Final Domestic Demand by Commodity 
The commodity composition of government consumption demand and investment 
demand is fixed, with demand patterns from the benchmark data set. Households are 
utility maximizers who respond to changes in relative prices and incomes. In this version 
of the model, the utility functions for private households take the Stone-Geary form and 
hence consumer demand by commodity is described by a Linear Expenditure System 
(LES) specification.  
 
Macro Closure 
For this exercise a “neutral” or “balanced” set of macro closure rules is specified. Current 
account balances for all regions are assumed to be fixed at initial benchmark levels in 
terms of the global numeraire
5
 and real exchange rates adjust to maintain external 
equilibrium. This assumption ensures that there are no changes in future „claims‟ on 
exports across the regions in the model, i.e., the net asset positions are fixed. Changes in 
aggregate absorption are assumed to be shared equally among private consumption, 
government, and investment demands.  
 
Benchmark Data and Calibration 
The model is calibrated to a social accounting matrix representation of the GTAP 7.0 
database (Narayanan and Walmsley (eds.), 2008) that combines detailed bilateral trade, 
and protection data reflecting economic linkages among regions with individual country 
input-output data, which account for intersectoral linkages within regions, for the 
benchmark year 2004. The elasticities of substitution between imports by origin in Table 
A.2 are aggregated from the GTAP behavioural parameter database (Dimaran, 
McDougall and Hertel, 2006) (after re-scaling by a factor 0.5 in the case of the short-run 
closure considered below). The elasticities in this database are based on an econometric 
study by Hertel, Hummels, Ivanic and Keeney (2007) and distinguish 57 commodity 
groups. In the same database, the Armington elasticities of substitution between domestic 
                                                 
5
 The numeraire is the commodity basket underlying the OECD America consumer price index (CPI), 
which is normalised at unity. This choice allows us to represent changes in nominal export values at world 
market prices in the model as changes in $ export revenues (whereby a $ has constant purchasing power in 
the precise sense that one $ can always buy one unit of the OECD America CPI basket). 
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commodities and aggregate imports are determined by the so-called  “rule of two”, i.e. 
the Armington elasticities are assumed to be half as large as the elasticities of substitution 
between imports by origin. Some empirical support for this ad-hoc rule is provided by 
Liu, Arndt and Hertel (2004). The elasticities for the 57 GTAP sectors are aggregated to 
the 5 sectors of the present model using each destination region‟s sub-sectoral benchmark 
gross absorption shares and sub-sectoral import shares as weights. The sectoral factor 
substitution elasticities are likewise aggregations of the corresponding GTAP database 
parameters using region-specific sectoral value added shares. 
 
2.2 Trade Patterns of Developing Regions in the Benchmark Data Set 
Tables 2 to 4 show features of 2004 trade patterns for the 28 developing countries and 
regions in the benchmark data set. The first column of Table 2 shows the shares of 
individual country/region in total exports of goods and services of developing countries 
to all destinations.
6
 China alone accounts for 35 percent of the total, while sub-Saharan 
Africa accounts for less than 10 percent of total DC exports. The remaining columns of 
Table 3 show the commodity composition of exports by region. While the Asian DCs 
predominantly export manufactures, the exports of a subset of African regions including 
North Africa, Nigeria, Central and South Central Africa, and Uganda are strongly 
dominated by fuels. Table 3 provides the corresponding shares on the import side. 
The last column of Table 2 shows the shares of DC exports to OECD
+
 regions in total DC 
exports of goods and services by country, while the last column of Table 3 shows the 
share of imports of OECD
+
 origin in DC imports of goods and services. On average, 
nearly three-quarters of DC exports go to high-income countries, while 60 percent of DC 
imports are of OECD
+
 origin. Table 4 exhibits net exports – i.e. the difference between 
exports and imports - by country and commodity group.  
                                                 
6
 Note that for aggregate regions, the figures include intra-region trade. 
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Table 1: Regional Disaggregation of the Model 
Least Developed Countries (LDCs) according to UN classification in italics 
Code Description Notes on Composite Regions 
Cambodia Cambodia  
Vietnam Vietnam  
Myanmar Myanmar  
Indonesia Indonesia  
Bangladesh Bangladesh  
India India  
Pakistan Pakistan  
China China  
KyrgyzRepub Kyrgyz Republic  
RoSoAsia Rest of South Asia Afghanistan, Nepal, Bhutan, Maldives 
RoAsia Rest of Asia except Middle East 
RoAmericas Rest of the Americas Central and South America, Caribbean 
NorthAfrica North Africa Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia 
Nigeria Nigeria  
Senegal Senegal  
RoWAfrica Rest of Western Africa Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, 
Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Sierra Leone, Togo 
CntrlAfrica Central Africa Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Sao Tome and Principe 
SCntrlAfrica South Central Africa Democratic Republic Congo, Angola 
Ethiopia Ethiopia  
Malawi Malawi  
Mozambique Mozambique  
Tanzania Tanzania  
Uganda Uganda  
Zambia Zambia  
Zimbabwe Zimbabwe  
RoEAfrica Rest of Eastern Africa Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Burundi, Djibuti, Eritrea, 
Somalia, East African island states 
SouthAfrica Republic South Africa  
RoSACU Rest of South African Customs 
Union 
Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland 
OECDAsia OECD Asia and Oceania, Other 
High-Income Asia 
Japan, Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, 
Taiwan, Hong Kong 
OECDEurope OECD Europe and Other EU includes EU candidate countries inc. Turkey  
OECDAmerica OECD North America Canada, Mexico, USA 
RoW Rest of the World Former Soviet Union, Rest of Eastern Europe, 
Middle East 
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Table 2:  Structural Features of Developing Country Exports - 2004 
Percentage shares  
  
Share in DC 
Exports AgFood Fuels OPrimary NfManuf Services 
OECD
+
 
Share 
Cambodia 0.2 3.1 1.6 0.1 79.2 16.0 90.7 
Vietnam 1.7 17.8 11.3 0.3 59.6 10.9 75.8 
Myanmar 0.1 19.5 28.1 12.6 31.9 7.9 38.4 
Indonesia 4.4 11.4 16.2 2.6 62.5 7.2 70.9 
Bangladesh 0.5 5.7 0.0 0.1 83.0 11.1 91.4 
India 5.3 8.9 3.6 1.8 63.3 22.4 61.4 
Pakistan 0.8 9.8 1.0 0.3 70.3 18.6 68.3 
China 35.2 3.6 1.9 0.4 85.7 8.5 81.9 
KyrgyzRepub 0.1 14.3 0.4 0.4 47.1 37.8 31.0 
RoSoAsia 0.1 11.5 11.7 1.2 31.4 44.3 65.1 
RoAsia 18.4 8.4 4.5 0.8 71.8 14.5 68.4 
RoAmericas 18.3 21.9 15.7 4.5 41.0 16.8 67.3 
NorthAfrica 5.2 5.8 42.3 1.1 24.7 26.1 83.9 
Nigeria 1.9 1.5 86.8 0.2 2.6 8.9 65.1 
Senegal 0.1 28.6 1.5 2.4 31.9 35.5 53.5 
RoWAfrica 1.0 38.1 9.9 8.1 28.7 15.1 68.0 
CntrlAfrica 0.7 7.1 55.0 10.7 11.5 15.6 79.9 
SCntrlAfrica 0.7 0.9 86.0 4.1 2.4 6.6 54.4 
Ethiopia 0.1 31.8 0.0 2.1 12.5 53.6 70.6 
Malawi 0.0 57.2 23.1 0.1 13.5 6.0 64.9 
Mozambique 0.1 14.6 0.1 0.7 54.1 30.4 72.8 
Tanzania 0.1 37.3 0.0 6.8 19.6 36.2 57.0 
Uganda 0.1 33.9 38.5 0.4 10.9 16.3 70.3 
Zambia 0.1 16.8 0.0 3.5 71.7 7.9 43.4 
Zimbabwe 0.1 36.5 0.3 13.3 39.9 9.9 50.9 
RoEAfrica 0.9 25.3 17.7 1.5 29.2 26.2 66.3 
SouthAfrica 3.2 10.3 7.4 7.6 61.3 13.4 64.2 
RoSACU 0.6 13.5 3.2 32.3 37.8 13.2 66.1 
Total/Average 100 9.8 10.7 2.0 64.0 13.5 73.4 
Source: Own calculations based on GTAP7 Database 
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Table 3:  Structural Features of Developing Country Imports - 2004 
Percentage shares  
  
Share in DC 
Exports AgFood Fuels OPrimary NfManuf Services 
OECD
+
 
Share 
Cambodia 0.2 12.3 2.5 0.1 76.4 8.7 37.0 
Vietnam 2.2 7.7 10.1 1.0 71.4 9.8 53.5 
Myanmar 0.2 14.1 10.6 0.1 67.5 7.7 34.4 
Indonesia 4.2 8.8 12.7 0.8 58.7 19.1 62.6 
Bangladesh 0.8 20.0 9.3 0.8 64.2 5.7 33.8 
India 7.6 5.9 22.8 7.3 50.6 13.3 44.6 
Pakistan 1.6 10.7 14.4 0.6 55.2 19.2 46.0 
China 33.4 4.5 7.0 3.1 75.9 9.4 70.4 
KyrgyzRepub 0.1 9.2 15.4 0.6 65.0 9.7 25.4 
RoSoAsia 0.3 16.1 10.3 0.5 62.0 11.0 31.1 
RoAsia 16.4 7.8 7.9 1.0 72.4 10.9 60.3 
RoAmericas 17.2 8.7 9.8 0.9 64.6 16.1 56.9 
NorthAfrica 5.5 14.8 4.7 1.2 66.0 13.4 62.9 
Nigeria 1.3 12.7 11.4 0.1 56.5 19.3 57.0 
Senegal 0.2 26.4 12.8 2.0 48.7 10.1 48.1 
RoWAfrica 1.6 18.5 6.0 0.3 64.1 11.1 54.6 
CntrlAfrica 0.5 15.1 3.2 0.6 50.7 30.3 66.2 
SCntrlAfrica 0.7 13.2 3.6 0.2 51.1 32.0 69.1 
Ethiopia 0.2 8.3 12.1 0.2 62.5 17.0 50.9 
Malawi 0.1 17.4 5.3 0.5 67.5 9.3 30.1 
Mozambique 0.1 23.3 8.3 0.3 49.1 19.1 32.2 
Tanzania 0.2 13.7 7.9 0.2 61.9 16.4 39.4 
Uganda 0.1 13.1 9.3 0.8 58.8 18.1 42.8 
Zambia 0.1 8.2 8.7 1.6 67.8 13.6 26.3 
Zimbabwe 0.1 16.7 7.5 0.7 63.1 11.9 20.0 
RoEAfrica 1.3 15.8 5.8 0.6 66.3 11.5 44.7 
SouthAfrica 3.1 6.4 10.8 1.9 69.6 11.2 58.7 
RoSACU 0.5 14.5 6.6 0.8 62.4 15.8 23.1 
Total/Average 100.0 7.9 9.3 2.1 68.2 12.5 60.6 
Source: Own calculations based on GTAP7 Database 
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Table 4: DC Net Exports by Commodity Group – 2004 
in bill US$ 2004 
  AgFood Fuels OPrimary NfManuf Services 
Cambodia -0.32 -0.03 0.00 0.55 0.37 
Vietnam 2.36 1.26 -0.16 -10.86 -0.72 
Myanmar 0.10 0.40 0.46 -1.34 -0.03 
Indonesia 3.19 3.96 1.59 7.83 -9.37 
Bangladesh -2.46 -1.43 -0.12 -0.97 0.33 
India 0.95 -29.19 -5.79 -8.88 3.02 
Pakistan -1.68 -4.24 -0.13 -5.28 -2.90 
China -3.91 -31.70 -16.87 104.36 -0.85 
KyrgyzRepub -0.01 -0.27 -0.01 -0.61 0.23 
RoSoAsia -0.69 -0.32 0.00 -3.08 0.57 
RoAsia 5.89 -8.37 0.39 40.73 13.20 
RoAmericas 52.68 22.70 16.63 -63.20 7.15 
NorthAfrica -9.53 36.71 -0.04 -43.49 13.15 
Nigeria -2.59 29.23 0.05 -13.14 -1.45 
Senegal -0.55 -0.49 -0.03 -1.38 0.23 
RoWAfrica 1.65 0.07 1.45 -14.55 -0.63 
CntrlAfrica -0.55 7.42 1.57 -3.69 -1.13 
SCntrlAfrica -1.72 11.55 0.47 -6.79 -3.80 
Ethiopia 0.20 -0.49 0.03 -2.31 0.24 
Malawi 0.21 0.12 -0.01 -0.71 -0.07 
Mozambique -0.28 -0.21 0.04 -0.10 0.16 
Tanzania 0.33 -0.33 0.19 -2.15 0.19 
Uganda 0.34 0.52 -0.01 -1.07 -0.10 
Zambia 0.19 -0.19 0.04 0.02 -0.15 
Zimbabwe 0.48 -0.19 0.28 -0.74 -0.08 
RoEAfrica 0.15 2.88 0.11 -11.76 1.40 
SouthAfrica 2.46 -2.07 4.18 -3.96 1.60 
RoSACU 0.13 -0.25 3.45 -1.79 -0.02 
Total 9.8 10.7 2.0 64.0 13.5 
Source: Own calculations based on GTAP7 Database 
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3. Simulation Analysis 
The trade policy shocks considered in this section include stylised Doha Round scenarios 
based on the revised December 2008 draft modalities for agriculture and non-agricultural 
market access (WTO, 2008a,b) as well as a set of  scenarios based on the considerations 
in section 1, in which the Doha Development Agenda is abandoned and countries respond 
to the global crisis by raising their import duties to the maximum levels compatible with 
current WTO obligations. 
 
3.1 Stylised Doha Round Scenarios 
In line with WTO (2008a), the bound tariff cuts for agricultural goods shown in Table 5 
are implemented in the Doha scenarios. Furthermore, the developed countries eliminate 
their agricultural export subsidies. Domestic support for agricultural production is cut by 
80% in the OECD Europe, by 70% in OECD America and OECD Asia, and by 55% in 
other regions that grant domestic support to farmers.  
In line with WTO (2008b), for non-agricultural bound tariffs, the Swiss formula 
𝑇1 =
𝑎𝑇𝑜
𝑎+𝑇𝑜
   
with coefficient a=8 for OECD
+
 and a=22 for non-LDC developing countries is applied 
to determine the cut in bound tariffs, where To and T1 denote the pre- and post-Doha 
bound rates respectively. Note that the coefficient a determines the upper limit for the 
new bound rates. In the simulation analysis, the post-Doha applied rates for each bilateral 
import flow are set to minimum of the new bound rate and the applied rate in the GTAP 
benchmark dataset. All LDC tariffs remain unchanged.  
 
Table 5: Doha-Round Bound Tariff Cut Schedule for Agricultural Goods 
OECD
+
 Developing Countries except LDCs 
Pre-Doha Bound Rate Cut by Pre-Doha Bound Rate Cut by 
≤ 20 54% ≤ 30 33.3% 
>20 -50 57% >30 – 80 38.0% 
>50 -75 64% >80 -130 42.7% 
>75 70% >130 46.7% 
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Table 6 shows the pre- and post-Doha bound rates along with the average applied rates in 
the pre-Doha benchmark equilibrium. The fact that for developing countries the new 
bound rates remain in many cases well above the average applied rates due to large initial 
binding overhangs does not necessarily imply that the tariff cuts in these cases are 
entirely ineffective, because often the tariffs on some bilateral import flows are well 
above the reported simple averages. 
 
The doha columns in Tables 7 and 8 report the resulting aggregate changes in trade of 
goods and services as well as in welfare by country as measured by real absorption
7
 (i.e. 
the sum of private consumption, public consumption and investment spending) for the 
two factor market closures and elasticity configurations under consideration. 
Table 7 reports the results for a standard neoclassical long-run closure with flexible factor 
prices and standard magnitudes for the elasticities that govern the price responsiveness of 
trade flows and the substitutability among primary production factors. In contrast, the 
results in Table 8 are based on a short-run closure with lower elasticities, unlimited 
supplies of labour and underutilized physical capital – a closure option that may be 
considered more appropriate for the present global economic crisis situation. 
In line with previous comparative-static CGE assessments of the Doha Round, the 
aggregate real welfare gains are moderate to negligible for most developing regions under 
the neoclassical closure. A notable exception is Cambodia with a rise in real absorption 
on the order of 2.6 percent. Cambodia is among the countries hardest hit by the 
notoriously high US tariffs on clothing and footwear
8
 and enjoys a significant terms of 
trade gain as tariffs on its manufacturing tariffs to OECD America drop from 9.8 percent 
to 2.7 percent in the simulation analysis. While other Asian low-income exporters of 
manufactures including Vietnam, Myanmar, Bangladesh and Pakistan enjoy US import 
tariff cuts of a similar magnitude, the resulting aggregate welfare gain is far more 
                                                 
7
 Note that changes in real absorption are almost perfectly correlated with the Hicksian equivalent variation 
as a percentage of benchmark consumption expenditure, and hence the Hicksian welfare measures are not 
separately reported. 
8
 See e.g. Elliott (2007) and PPI (2007). In 2006, US duties collected on imports from Cambodia amounted 
to $ 366 mill. (Elliott, 2007). In the same year, US net disbursements of overseas development assistance to 
the country amounted to $ 58 mill. (stats.oecd.org). 
14 
 
pronounced for Cambodia, because the country combines a very high exports/GDP ratio 
(95 percent vis-à-vis around 20 percent for Bangladesh and Pakistan) with a high share of 
non-food manufacturing exports in total exports of goods and services (79 percent) and a 
high OECD America destination share in total non-food manufacturing exports (62 
percent vis-à-vis around 30 percent for Bangladesh, Vietnam and Pakistan). 
Only two further developing regions – Malawi and the rest of the South African Customs 
Union comprising Namibia, Swasiland and Lesotho – experience welfare gains in excess 
of one percent in this simulation. The small negative real absorption results for a range of 
LDCs primarily located in sub-Saharan Africa can be explained by preference erosion 
effects
9
 in combination with the absence of gains from own import tariff cuts. These 
countries gain little in terms of improved market access to the OECD regions as tariffs on 
their exports are already generally low in the status quo ante, but face increased 
competition from third countries in their export markets after the Doha Round tariff cuts.  
The net food importers in this group such as Nigeria, Senegal, Mozambique, Central and 
South Central Africa are furthermore adversely affected by world market food price rises 
associated with the cuts in agricultural domestic support and export subsidies within 
Europe and the USA. 
As shown in Table 8, a switch to the alternative factor market closure with unlimited 
supplies of unskilled and skilled labour at a fixed real wage and excess capacity generally 
magnifies the welfare effects in either direction. In countries benefiting from the Doha 
Round under the neoclassical full employment closure with fixed factor endowment, the 
rise in both export demand and domestic demand generates additional employment under 
the alternative closure, and hence real GDP grows.  Vietnam‟s real GDP, for instance, is 
boosted by nearly five percent. In contrast, the majority of countries with small welfare 
losses under the neoclassical closure experience slight increases in unemployment and 
hence marginally stronger reductions in real absorption under the alternative closure. 
 
 
                                                 
9
 The prediction of noticeable preference erosion effects for a sub-set of LDCs in sub-Saharan Africa is 
largely consistent with the corresponding partial-analytic results in Amiti and Romalis (2006). See also 
Yang (2005). 
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3.2 WTO-Consistent Protection Scenarios 
The differences between the pre-Doha Round bound rates and the average applied rates 
reported in Table 6 reveal the large extent of binding overhang, particularly for the 
developing countries and regions in the model. In the protec scenarios, countries are 
assumed to make full use of the policy space offered by these overhangs and raise their 
applied tariffs all the way to the pre-Doha WTO bound rates. Exceptions are the internal 
tariffs of composite regions in the model. Thus, barriers to trade among the members of 
regional trade agreements within composite regions – such as the European Single 
Market, NAFTA and MERCOSUL – remain unchanged in the simulation analysis. In 
cases where no previous tariff bindings exist, the new tariff rate is set to the maximum of 
the 2004 applied rates imposed by the country in the corresponding commodity group. 
The protecl scenarios differ from the protec scenarios in one respect: The exports of 
LDCs to the OECD are exempted from tariff rises, i.e. in these scenarios the OECD 
countries continue to grant preferential market access to the poorest countries under 
schemes including the Everything But Arms initiative, the African Growth and 
Opportunity Act and GSP
+
. 
 
The messages from Tables 7 and 8 are unambiguous and stark:  A global resort to WTO-
rule-consistent protectionism in response to the crisis would have drastic implications for 
developing country trade and welfare across the board. Trade volumes drop sharply – 
most developing countries in the model experience percentage declines in aggregate real 
export production of double-digit orders along with corresponding reductions in 
aggregate import volumes. For some countries including Bangladesh, Pakistan and 
Tanzania real exports of goods and services fall by over 25% under the long-run full-
employment closure. Under the short-run closure with factor price rigidities export 
production in Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia is curtailed by more than one-third. 
Even under the neoclassical long-run factor market closure, in which factor price 
flexibility prevents unemployment and underutilization of capital, the simulated 
protection shock entails substantial aggregate welfare losses for most developing 
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countries. Myanmar, Nigeria and Zimbabwe experience real absorption losses in excess 
of three percent and no developing country in the model gains from the imposition of 
higher barriers to trade in this scenario. The message here is plain and by no means 
surprising – beggar-your-neighbour trade policies are not only bound to fail but are 
clearly self-defeating. 
This message is dramatically reinforced by the real absorption and GDP results in Table 8 
for the short-run closure, in which the adverse demand shocks triggered by rising trade 
barriers are allowed to affect aggregate employment while real factor prices for labour 
and capital do not adjust. Here the consequences of the simulated global protectionist 
response for developing regions can only be described as devastating. For many countries 
real GDP and absorption drop by more than ten percent and for some countries in sub-
Saharan Africa including Zambia, Zimbabwe and rest of SACU by more than 20 percent 
– a grim scenario with obviously catastrophic implications for poverty levels across the 
globe that need not be spelled out in detail. Moreover, it is a scenario in which all hopes 
of an impending global economic recovery - let alone hopes of further progress towards 
the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals - can safely be abandoned. It is 
noteworthy, that under this short-run scenario even the rich OECD regions, and in 
particular high-income Asia, are significantly dragged down by the protection-induced 
depression in the developing world. In contrast in the long-run scenario the OECD 
regions remain largely unaffected by the counterfactual protection shock, since by 
assumption trade barriers within each of the three OECD regions do not change and the 
scope for WTO-compatible increases in duties on imports among the OECD regions, 
which accounts for most trade of these regions, is very limited. 
The assumption of no real wage and rental rate of capital adjustment underlying the 
results in Table 8 is certainly strong, and it might be argued that the “true” short run 
impacts of the counterfactual policy shock under consideration are likely to be 
somewhere in between the results reported in Table 7 and Table 8. However, it is worth 
re-emphasizing that the scenario reported in Table 8 was by no means deliberately set up 
as an extreme doom-and-gloom scenario. To reiterate, in the protection scenario 
considered here, all countries continue to comply with their WTO obligations. 
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Table 6: Pre- and Post- Doha Round Bound and Average Applied Tariff Rates 
Percent 
  Pre-Doha Bound Post-Doha Bound Pre-Doha Ave Applied   
  AgFood Fuels Oprimary NfManu AgFood Fuels Oprimary NfManu AgFood Fuels Oprimary NfManu 
OECDAsia 23.0 23.0 5.0 8.0 9.9 5.9 3.1 4.0 12.5 1.2 0.5 2.0 
Cambodia 28.1 22.7 10.9 17.7 28.1 22.7 10.9 17.7 7.6 2.0 5.0 10.7 
Vietnam 18.5 34.2 11.0 10.4 12.4 13.4 7.3 7.1 14.2 4.7 2.3 8.8 
Myanmar 102.2 25.0 23.6 21.1 102.2 25.0 23.6 21.1 5.1 0.2 0.7 1.9 
Indonesia 47.0 40.0 38.8 35.6 29.1 14.2 14.0 13.6 3.2 0.9 1.7 3.7 
Bangladesh 192.0 40.7 35.6 34.4 192.0 40.7 35.6 34.4 9.2 10.5 4.9 13.9 
India 114.2 39.7 38.3 36.2 65.4 14.2 14.0 13.7 33.6 8.7 10.3 14.3 
Pakistan 95.6 66.4 64.7 54.6 54.8 16.5 16.4 15.7 12.0 5.7 13.1 14.2 
China 15.8 3.3 8.0 9.1 10.6 2.9 5.9 6.4 7.1 1.6 0.9 5.3 
KyrgyzRepub 13.1 9.1 5.4 6.7 8.8 6.4 4.3 5.1 4.0 1.0 1.2 3.7 
RoSoAsia 40.0 15.0 25.0 25.0 40.0 8.9 11.7 11.7 9.0 5.8 6.0 11.5 
RoAsia 128.7 15.1 24.8 17.1 73.7 9.0 11.7 9.6 23.8 2.1 3.2 6.8 
OECDAmerica 8.0 2.0 2.0 4.0 4.0 1.6 1.6 2.7 6.1 0.4 0.6 3.3 
RoAmericas 30.0 32.5 30.0 30.0 20.1 13.1 12.7 12.7 9.4 1.8 2.7 9.0 
OECDEurope 15.1 2.0 2.0 3.9 7.6 1.6 1.6 2.6 12.1 0.1 0.1 1.4 
NorthAfrica 60.0 10.0 32.0 39.0 37.2 6.9 13.0 14.1 14.0 3.9 6.3 17.3 
Nigeria 150.0 24.5 55.6 48.5 80.0 11.6 15.8 15.1 24.6 12.5 6.6 18.1 
Senegal 29.8 30.0 30.0 30.0 29.8 30.0 30.0 30.0 9.3 2.4 2.6 10.3 
RoWAfrica 97.1 58.8 31.8 34.7 97.1 58.8 31.8 34.7 11.1 8.5 4.8 10.3 
CntrlAfrica 80.0 15.2 21.7 50.0 80.0 15.2 21.7 50.0 18.9 5.5 7.4 14.8 
SCntrlAfrica 75.0 85.0 80.0 75.0 75.0 85.0 80.0 75.0 9.3 5.2 5.9 8.9 
Ethiopia 35.8 5.6 7.5 35.9 35.8 5.6 7.5 35.9 16.2 1.0 3.2 14.7 
Malawi 121.3 9.5 41.0 42.4 121.3 9.5 41.0 42.4 7.7 2.1 0.6 8.4 
Mozambique 100.0 7.5 5.1 6.6 100.0 7.5 5.1 6.6 7.7 2.8 1.3 8.0 
Tanzania 120.0 1.7 7.6 120.0 120.0 1.7 7.6 120.0 13.1 0.7 1.3 9.2 
Uganda 77.7 6.9 8.0 50.6 48.2 5.3 5.9 15.3 7.1 1.6 1.9 5.6 
Zambia 123.3 23.0 36.1 42.2 123.3 23.0 36.1 42.2 9.9 5.1 2.5 8.5 
Zimbabwe 140.1 10.5 11.6 10.8 74.7 7.1 7.6 7.2 14.0 2.5 2.1 18.6 
RoEAfrica 90.0 40.0 62.0 60.0 90.0 40.0 62.0 60.0 14.1 3.4 5.2 13.1 
SouthAfrica 40.8 5.2 11.8 15.7 25.3 4.2 7.7 9.2 7.0 0.3 0.3 8.2 
RoSACU 40.8 5.2 11.8 15.7 25.3 4.2 7.7 9.2 8.7 0.7 0.1 10.6 
RoW 22.4 9.0 20.0 13.9 15.0 6.4 10.5 8.5 9.5 2.0 3.3 6.4 
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Table 7: Results for Long-Run Full Employment Closure 
Percentage Changes 
  Real Absorption Real Exports Real Imports 
  doha protec protecl doha protec protecl doha protec protecl 
OECDAsia 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.55 -4.13 -4.07 0.68 -4.14 -4.13 
Cambodia 2.55 -0.87 0.45 2.14 -5.23 -4.74 5.18 -6.76 -4.88 
Vietnam 0.46 -1.60 -1.60 8.41 -4.19 -4.19 7.02 -4.77 -4.76 
Myanmar 0.30 -3.16 -2.71 1.63 -18.45 -17.94 1.93 -18.74 -17.57 
Indonesia 0.15 -0.23 -0.24 0.15 -19.22 -19.23 0.62 -19.19 -19.22 
Bangladesh 0.20 -0.80 -0.44 1.29 -25.71 -24.55 1.68 -17.61 -15.61 
India 0.11 -0.33 -0.33 1.03 -15.65 -15.63 1.14 -10.59 -10.58 
Pakistan 0.24 -0.56 -0.56 3.07 -25.81 -25.79 2.42 -13.27 -13.26 
China 0.23 -0.36 -0.36 0.85 -3.25 -3.25 1.39 -3.94 -3.95 
KyrgyzRepub -0.11 -0.79 -0.79 3.18 -7.27 -7.27 1.70 -5.19 -5.19 
RoSoAsia 0.00 -0.87 -0.76 0.69 -9.90 -9.37 0.28 -6.13 -5.66 
RoAsia 0.29 -0.26 -0.26 -0.33 -12.02 -12.02 -0.06 -13.24 -13.24 
OECDAmerica 0.00 -0.13 -0.14 0.22 -1.52 -1.52 0.13 -1.83 -1.84 
RoAmericas 0.24 -0.08 -0.08 0.18 -7.78 -7.78 1.30 -7.64 -7.64 
OECDEurope -0.01 -0.13 -0.13 0.21 -0.53 -0.51 0.15 -0.81 -0.81 
NorthAfrica -0.01 -0.44 -0.44 0.75 -9.70 -9.70 0.71 -9.47 -9.47 
Nigeria -0.05 -3.57 -3.58 1.73 -4.17 -4.18 2.54 -12.25 -12.28 
Senegal -0.10 -1.00 -0.55 0.02 -18.60 -16.80 -0.22 -8.46 -6.99 
RoWAfrica -0.07 -1.38 -0.34 0.12 -17.62 -16.29 -0.08 -11.38 -8.92 
CntrlAfrica 0.04 -1.02 0.19 -0.01 -7.74 -7.67 0.16 -12.28 -8.44 
SCntrlAfrica -0.03 -2.69 -1.63 0.01 -13.96 -13.41 -0.04 -14.87 -12.79 
Ethiopia -0.07 -0.63 -0.26 -0.10 -11.46 -9.88 -0.19 -5.47 -4.15 
Malawi 1.15 -1.51 -1.08 2.47 -20.78 -19.72 3.54 -12.77 -11.50 
Mozambique -0.09 -1.11 -0.37 0.95 -12.03 -10.95 0.57 -10.91 -8.47 
Tanzania -0.08 -2.17 -1.78 -0.11 -29.34 -28.15 -0.31 -17.91 -16.43 
Uganda -0.07 -1.66 -0.61 -0.07 -15.52 -14.41 -0.30 -16.09 -12.17 
Zambia -0.02 -2.30 -1.44 -0.13 -20.17 -19.43 -0.13 -20.34 -18.02 
Zimbabwe 0.96 -3.00 -2.39 4.46 -8.99 -8.42 5.56 -10.76 -9.39 
RoEAfrica 0.33 -1.00 -0.26 0.37 -20.38 -18.97 1.27 -14.30 -11.77 
SouthAfrica 0.01 -0.63 -0.61 0.34 -7.77 -7.75 0.35 -9.22 -9.14 
RoSACU 1.17 -0.39 -0.39 0.41 -9.69 -9.69 2.62 -10.92 -10.91 
RoW -0.02 -0.77 -0.78 0.08 -1.94 -1.94 0.03 -3.64 -3.66 
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Table 8: Results for Short-Run Closure with Unemployment 
Changes in Percent  
  Real Absorption Real Exports Real GDP 
  doha protec protecl doha protec protecl doha protec protecl 
OECDAsia 1.07 -8.82 -8.71 1.41 -10.37 -10.23 1.18 -9.23 -9.12 
Cambodia 3.68 -8.22 -6.52 0.99 -6.08 -6.04 1.43 -5.49 -5.00 
Vietnam 2.66 -7.61 -7.56 7.87 -6.90 -6.86 4.97 -6.54 -6.50 
Myanmar 0.83 -9.26 -8.78 1.45 -15.81 -15.73 0.75 -7.73 -7.67 
Indonesia 0.38 -11.86 -11.82 0.07 -19.88 -19.86 0.20 -12.35 -12.32 
Bangladesh 0.62 -10.72 -9.71 0.86 -28.78 -27.81 0.53 -12.30 -11.49 
India 0.34 -4.00 -3.98 0.90 -13.29 -13.27 0.38 -4.52 -4.51 
Pakistan 0.71 -7.31 -7.29 2.16 -24.32 -24.29 0.75 -9.12 -9.10 
China 0.61 -4.57 -4.53 0.53 -4.22 -4.20 0.36 -3.36 -3.34 
KyrgyzRepub 0.59 -3.77 -3.75 3.43 -9.79 -9.76 1.71 -5.55 -5.53 
RoSoAsia 0.09 -4.98 -4.72 0.48 -10.94 -10.48 0.17 -5.52 -5.26 
RoAsia 0.49 -12.38 -12.31 -0.36 -18.73 -18.71 0.01 -14.76 -14.73 
OECDAmerica 0.06 -3.30 -3.27 0.19 -4.05 -4.01 0.07 -3.28 -3.25 
RoAmericas 0.65 -8.08 -8.05 0.22 -10.46 -10.45 0.48 -8.33 -8.30 
OECDEurope -0.87 -2.55 -2.48 -0.85 -2.30 -2.22 -0.95 -2.30 -2.23 
NorthAfrica 0.00 -10.04 -9.98 0.55 -12.88 -12.85 0.23 -10.47 -10.43 
Nigeria 0.82 -16.14 -16.06 1.35 -5.72 -5.73 0.95 -8.38 -8.36 
Senegal -0.39 -9.16 -7.65 -0.41 -24.55 -21.90 -0.36 -13.40 -11.57 
RoWAfrica -0.27 -9.85 -7.67 -0.19 -23.96 -21.46 -0.21 -13.29 -11.20 
CntrlAfrica -0.19 -11.91 -10.04 -0.13 -9.33 -9.27 -0.16 -10.08 -9.20 
SCntrlAfrica -0.01 -17.77 -16.09 -0.02 -20.23 -19.08 -0.03 -16.48 -15.34 
Ethiopia -0.19 -4.46 -3.56 -0.20 -13.15 -11.48 -0.15 -6.05 -5.10 
Malawi 2.41 -18.56 -17.44 2.44 -36.38 -33.66 2.31 -24.07 -22.75 
Mozambique 0.39 -12.47 -10.69 1.27 -24.56 -22.75 0.71 -14.90 -13.31 
Tanzania -0.17 -15.07 -13.93 -0.13 -35.07 -33.58 -0.12 -18.18 -17.12 
Uganda -0.17 -13.38 -10.67 -0.09 -19.08 -17.20 -0.11 -12.80 -10.66 
Zambia 0.16 -24.08 -21.93 0.01 -35.73 -34.10 0.10 -27.16 -25.34 
Zimbabwe 3.61 -20.04 -18.78 5.03 -25.35 -24.34 4.29 -22.63 -21.55 
RoEAfrica 0.71 -13.82 -12.08 0.51 -26.81 -24.43 0.59 -16.83 -15.23 
SouthAfrica 0.28 -13.84 -13.63 0.47 -16.09 -15.93 0.34 -14.48 -14.30 
RoSACU 2.69 -20.32 -20.17 2.57 -25.51 -25.43 2.81 -23.38 -23.27 
RoW -0.22 -6.40 -6.35 -0.02 -2.12 -2.10 -0.13 -4.05 -4.01 
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Table 9: Decomposition of Absorption Effects of Short-Run protec Scenario 
  protec AgFd Fuels OPrim Manuf protec AgFd Fuels OPrim Manuf 
OECDAsia -8.82 -1.03 -3.74 -0.06 -3.63 100.0 11.7 42.4 0.7 41.2 
Cambodia -8.22 -1.84 -1.58 -0.10 -4.36 100.0 22.4 19.3 1.3 53.1 
Vietnam -7.61 -1.76 -3.01 -0.09 -2.59 100.0 23.1 39.6 1.1 34.0 
Myanmar -9.26 -2.96 -2.75 -0.86 -2.58 100.0 32.0 29.6 9.3 27.8 
Indonesia -11.86 -2.12 -3.04 -0.15 -6.18 100.0 17.8 25.7 1.3 52.1 
Bangladesh -10.72 -6.81 -0.67 -0.04 -3.23 100.0 63.5 6.3 0.4 30.1 
India -4.00 -0.62 -2.33 -0.23 -0.79 100.0 15.4 58.2 5.7 19.7 
Pakistan -7.31 -1.87 -3.03 -0.05 -2.92 100.0 25.6 41.4 0.7 39.9 
China -4.57 -0.72 -1.02 -0.05 -2.38 100.0 15.7 22.4 1.1 52.1 
KyrgyzRepub -3.77 -0.93 -0.21 -0.13 -2.17 100.0 24.8 5.6 3.3 57.6 
RoSoAsia -4.98 -1.38 -0.52 -0.12 -2.81 100.0 27.7 10.4 2.3 56.4 
RoAsia -12.38 -3.71 -2.13 -0.11 -5.89 100.0 30.0 17.2 0.9 47.6 
OECDAmerica -3.30 -0.52 -0.04 -0.03 -2.27 100.0 15.8 1.1 0.8 68.6 
RoAmericas -8.08 -1.20 -1.49 -0.17 -4.65 100.0 14.8 18.4 2.0 57.5 
OECDEurope -2.55 -0.50 0.48 -0.05 -1.93 100.0 19.5 -18.7 2.1 75.5 
NorthAfrica -10.04 -2.29 -0.66 -0.19 -6.31 100.0 22.8 6.6 1.9 62.9 
Nigeria -16.14 -6.21 -5.56 -0.19 -4.07 100.0 38.4 34.5 1.2 25.2 
Senegal -9.16 -3.71 -0.83 -0.13 -4.69 100.0 40.5 9.0 1.5 51.2 
RoWAfrica -9.85 -4.42 -0.93 -0.17 -4.21 100.0 44.9 9.5 1.7 42.7 
CntrlAfrica -11.91 -3.84 -1.20 -0.28 -5.92 100.0 32.2 10.1 2.3 49.7 
SCntrlAfrica -17.77 -3.29 -4.40 -0.21 -8.71 100.0 18.5 24.8 1.2 49.0 
Ethiopia -4.46 -1.62 0.23 -0.12 -2.68 100.0 36.3 -5.2 2.7 60.1 
Malawi -18.56 -9.01 -0.89 -0.13 -7.73 100.0 48.5 4.8 0.7 41.7 
Mozambique -12.47 -8.14 -0.02 -0.14 -3.63 100.0 65.3 0.2 1.1 29.1 
Tanzania -15.07 -4.77 -0.01 -0.16 -10.37 100.0 31.6 0.1 1.0 68.8 
Uganda -13.38 -4.72 -1.00 -0.07 -6.29 100.0 35.2 7.4 0.6 47.0 
Zambia -24.08 -7.70 -0.96 -0.33 -13.89 100.0 32.0 4.0 1.4 57.7 
Zimbabwe -20.04 
-
11.35 0.07 -0.81 -7.19 100.0 56.7 -0.4 4.0 35.9 
RoEAfrica -13.82 -3.45 -1.43 -0.11 -8.28 100.0 24.9 10.3 0.8 59.9 
SouthAfrica -13.84 -4.72 -0.31 -0.27 -7.80 100.0 34.1 2.2 2.0 56.3 
RoSACU -20.32 -8.54 -0.12 -0.60 -10.88 100.0 42.0 0.6 2.9 53.6 
RoW -6.40 -0.97 -1.34 -0.19 -3.54 100.0 15.2 21.0 2.9 55.2 
 
 
Table 9 decomposes the welfare effects for the short-run closure by protected 
commodity. For instance, the AgFd column on the left-side panel shows the percentage 
change in real absorption by country if tariffs on imports of agricultural commodities and 
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processed food are raised to pre-Doha bound rates, while tariffs on all other goods remain 
unchanged. The corresponding column on the right-hand panel expresses this partial 
effect as a percentage of the total absorption effect due to a simultaneous rise in duties for 
all commodity groups. 
 
3.3 Interaction between OECD Recession and Trade Policy Shocks 
Table 10 combines the stylised simulation analysis of the impact of an OECD recession 
on developing countries via the trade channel in Robinson and Willenbockel (2009) with 
the Doha Round and protectionist response scenarios considered above. The OECD 
recession scenario assumes a drop in real GDP of the three OECD regions by five 
percent. This shock is introduced into the model through a corresponding proportional 
reduction in OECD primary factor endowments. Note that these simulations adopt the 
short-run factor market closure for the developing regions in the model but the 
neoclassical closure with real factor price flexibility for the OECD regions. Thus, a 
comparison of the protec results for real absorption in Tables 8 and 10 indicates, to which 
extent the welfare losses for developing countries in the former scenario are due to 
general equilibrium feedback effects associated with the contraction in OECD economic 
activity induced by the protection shock. For example, Nigeria‟s real absorption drops by 
16.1 percent in Table 8 and by 11.3 percent in Table 10, and thus nearly five percentage 
points of Nigeria‟s welfare loss can be attributed to the fall in OECD real income in 
Table 8 – both directly as a result of falling OECD demand for Nigerian oil and indirectly 
through the links between OECD GDP and the income of other countries that import 
from Nigeria. 
The combined Doha and recession scenario suggests that for a limited sub-set of low-
income countries, particularly in South and South-East Asia, a successful completion of 
the Doha Round would compensate for the adverse trade-related equilibrium welfare 
effects of the OECD recession, but for the majority of developing countries Doha would 
only partially  offset the crisis impacts through the trade channel.  
However, as the protectionist response and joint recession and protection scenarios 
confirm, a strong reason for a speedy conclusion of the Round - more precisely, a Round 
that is not hollowed out by a plethora of exceptions - lies in the resulting reduction of 
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binding overhangs that would make the realization of a protectionist response scenario 
along the lines considered here more unlikely.
10
 
  
                                                 
10
 Of course, LDCs that are exempted from cuts in bound rates would still be entitled to shoot their own leg 
in a WTO-rule-consistent manner. 
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Table 10: Interaction of OECD Recession and Trade Policy Scenarios 
  OECD   Doha and   
Protec 
and 
  Recession Doha Recession Protec Recession 
OECDAsia -4.88 0.02 -4.86 -0.19 -5.09 
Cambodia -2.98 3.55 0.64 -4.97 -7.97 
Vietnam -2.49 2.43 -0.07 -4.17 -6.59 
Myanmar -0.89 0.76 -0.13 -7.90 -8.86 
Indonesia -1.78 0.25 -1.53 -9.40 -11.33 
Bangladesh -0.52 0.62 0.10 -10.06 -10.73 
India -0.15 0.39 0.23 -4.24 -4.48 
Pakistan -0.31 0.72 0.41 -7.26 -7.61 
China -1.84 0.52 -1.31 -1.97 -3.91 
KyrgyzRepub -0.33 0.71 0.40 -3.69 -4.15 
RoSoAsia -0.36 0.90 0.53 -4.84 -5.28 
RoAsia -3.43 0.23 -3.18 -8.23 -11.67 
OECDAmerica -4.68 0.00 -4.69 -0.20 -4.89 
RoAmericas -1.95 0.70 -1.25 -6.40 -8.63 
OECDEurope -4.78 -0.01 -4.80 -0.25 -5.05 
NorthAfrica -3.20 0.36 -2.82 -7.38 -10.86 
Nigeria -4.81 1.03 -3.77 -11.37 -15.92 
Senegal -0.93 -0.16 -1.10 -9.03 -9.95 
RoWAfrica -1.70 -0.13 -1.83 -8.31 -10.11 
CntrlAfrica -3.37 0.11 -3.26 -8.77 -12.36 
SCntrlAfrica -4.28 0.12 -4.15 -12.38 -17.01 
Ethiopia -0.67 -0.10 -0.77 -4.19 -4.97 
Malawi -1.18 2.45 1.31 -17.00 -18.64 
Mozambique -1.11 0.52 -0.57 -11.79 -13.17 
Tanzania -0.67 -0.11 -0.78 -14.44 -15.34 
Uganda -1.31 -0.11 -1.41 -11.64 -13.42 
Zambia -0.95 0.20 -0.72 -23.13 -24.55 
Zimbabwe -1.44 3.63 2.24 -18.68 -20.56 
RoEAfrica -1.52 0.81 -0.70 -12.06 -14.07 
SouthAfrica -2.28 0.45 -1.81 -11.91 -14.57 
RoSACU -2.93 3.08 0.17 -18.16 -21.31 
RoW -3.39 0.03 -3.35 -3.38 -6.81 
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4. Conclusion 
The present WTO regulations governing the multilateral trading system leave 
considerable scope for rule-consistent increases in import barriers. This scope arises not 
only from trade remedy provisions, which allow conditional resort to anti-dumping 
measures, countervailing duties and safeguard measures, but also from the presence of 
substantial binding overhangs in pre-Doha tariff schedules.  
The illustrative simulation results presented in this paper confirm that a widespread resort 
to WTO-rule-consistent protectionism in response to the crisis would have drastic 
adverse implications for developing country trade and welfare, especially if factor market 
imperfections are taken into account. A swift successful completion of a meaningful 
Doha Round – i.e. a Doha Round that is not hollowed out by a plethora of exemptions - 
would gradually reduce existing binding overhangs considerably and would thus reduce 
the threat of a WTO-compliant rise in global protection that is bound to impede a global 
economic recovery. 
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